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Bower: Right to Privacy and Religious Freedom

COMMENT
HOW FAR CAN A STATE GO TO
PROTECT A FETUS? THE
REBECCA CORNEAU STORY AND
THE CASE FOR REQUIRING
MASSACHUSETTS TO FOLLOW
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
I. INTRODUCTION

The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that a state shall not deprive any person of
life, liberty or property without due process of law. 1 The Rebecca Comeau story illustrates the tremendous complexity attached to those seemingly uncomplicated words, as well as the
necessity that states abide by them. The Attleboro-Robidoux
Sect is a fundamentalist Christian group that rejects medical
treatment. 2 Rebecca Comeau is a member of that sect, and in
1999 she gave birth to a child, Jeremiah, who died in disputed
circumstances. 3 Jeremiah had not been born in a hospital. According to the Bristol County, Massachusetts District Attorney, Jeremiah died because Corneau failed to aspirate the
contents of the birth canal4 from his lungs. 5 Despite this alleSee u.s. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
See Frank J. Murray, Pregnant Woman in Custody After Refusing Medical
Exam, THE WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 1,2000, at A4.
3 See e.g. The Early Show: Paul Walsh Jr., District Attorney, and Lynne Paltrow,
Reproductive Rights Attorney, Discuss the Case of Rebecca Corneau, Member of a
Christian Sect that Rejects Medical Care (CBS television broadcast, Sept. 1, 2000)
(transcript on file with Burrelle's Inform(ltion Resources) [llereinafter Early Showl.
4 Aspiration is a routine procedure generally performed by a doctor or midwife
immediately following birth in which a clear airway is established. See VARNEY, VARI
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gation, Comeau insists that the child was stillbom. 6
At around the same time, another child in the sect also
died. 7 This child was a ten-month old boy who police believe
starved to death. 8 The bodies of both of these children were
found buried in Baxter State Park in Maine. 9 Massachusetts'
prosecutors are currently investigating the circumstances surrounding the deaths of both infants.Io Eight members of the
sect, including Corneau's husband,11 have been jailed in Massachusetts for failing to cooperate with the investigation. 12 Additionally, Comeau was pronounced an unfit mother and her
three living children were removed from her by the state. 13 Although a principal focus of the investigation of the Attleboro
Sect concerns the death of Jeremiah, Corneau has not been
charged with any crime. 14
In August of 2000, the state became aware that Corneau
was pregnant with another child. 15 The court ordered that
Comeau undergo a physical exam, which she refused to do. 16
Due to the circumstances surrounding the death of Jeremiah,
the state of Massachusetts feared for the safety of Comeau's
unborn fetus and ordered her to remain in a state-run medical facility in Boston for the remainder of her pregnancyY
While still in custody, Corneau gave birth to a healthy girl
who the court ordered to remain in state-custody until her
NEY's MIDWIFERY, 455-56 (3d ed. 1997).
5 See Early Show, supra note 3.
6 See David Abel, Pregnant Sect Member in State Custody, THE BOSTON GLOBE,
Sept. I, 2000, at AI.
7 See id.
S See Angie Cannon, A Case of Fetal Rights, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept.
25,2000.
9 See Sect Member Leads Police to Buried Bodies of 2 Infants, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, Oct. 25, 2000, at A9.
10 See Abel, supra note 6.
11 David Comeau told the police where the two infants were buried on October
24, 2000, in exchange for immunity for himself and Rebecca Comeau. See Sect Member Leads Police to Buried Bodies of 2 Infants, supra note 9.
12 See Cannon, supra note 8.
13 See CNN TALKBACK LIVE: How Far Can the State Go to Protect an Unborn
Child? (CNN television broadcast, Sept. 4, 2000) [hereinafter TALKBACK].
14 See id.
15 See id.
16 See Abel, supra note 6.
17 See Early Show, supra note 3.
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fate is decided by the courts. 1S
This comment will explore the question of whether a
state can take a pregnant woman into custody and subject her
to prenatal care despite her religious beliefs that prohibit her
from seeking medical care. Part II of this comment explains
the historical development of a woman's fundamental right to
privacy in making decisions concerning her pregnancy. Part II
also discusses the limited contexts in which a fetus has rights,
a person's right to free exercise of religion, and a person's
freedom to refuse medical care. Part III addresses the legal
procedures by which a state may confine a person against her
will and how this implicates a person's right to due process .
. Part IV critiques the Massachusetts court's forced confinement of Corneau. Part V discusses what a state should do
when confronted with a pregnant woman who refuses medical
care due to her religious belief that to receive medical care is
to "bow to a false God."19

II. BACKGROUND
A woman's fundamental right to privacy in making decisions concerning her pregnancy is relevant to Corneau's case
because her case highlights the question of whether states
have any right to intervene on behalf of an unborn fetus. 2o
This section will also discuss the limited rights of a fetus. 21
These rights have been articulated when states have attempted to intervene in a woman's choices concerning her
pregnancy.22 Several states have used these fetal rights to protect the fetus from harm caused by the behavior of the mother
during pregnancy.23 Finally, the right to refuse medical care
will be examined, as well as whether the right to free exercise
of religion supports an individual in her refusal of medical
care when this decision affects the life of her child. 24
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

Sect Member Leads Police to Buried Bodies of 2 Infants, supra note 9.
Abel, supra note 6.
infra notes 49 and 61-62 and accompanying text.
infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
infra notes 100-01 and 112-113 and accompanying text.
infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
infra notes 169-177 and accompanying text.
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A. A

WOMAN'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN MAKING CHOICES ABOUT
HER PREGNANCY

An individual's right to privacy is not specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights. 25 Although the framers of the Constitution did not include the right to privacy in the text of the
Constitution, the United States Supreme Court has found
that a right to privacy does exist and is protected by the Constitution. 26 Since its determination in 1965, courts have expanded this right to privacy and frequently invoke this right
to protect myriad circumstances in our private lives. 27
In 1965, the United States Supreme Court first articulated an individual's right to privacy.28 In Griswold v. Connecticut,29 the Court examined the right to privacy within the context of a Connecticut criminal statute that outlawed the
purchase and prescription of contraceptives. 30 The appellants
were medical professionals who had been convicted of giving
married couples information regarding contraception. 31 The
appellants had been found guilty as accessories under the
Connecticut Statute and were fined pursuant to the statute's
prohibition on using contraceptives or providing assistance in
their use. 32 Appellants challenged the constitutionality of the
Connecticut statute claiming it violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 33
The Court identified the issue to be whether the Connecticut statute violated a person's right to privacy in the context
of the intimate relationship of marriage. 34 The Court deterSee infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 28 and 35-36 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 44-50 and 56 and 171 and accompanying text.
28 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
29 See id.
30 See id. at 480 (providing that General Statutes of Connecticut § 53-32 states
that "any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose
of preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not
less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned." Section 54-196 states that "any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were
the principal offender.").
31 See id.
32 See id.
33 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480.
34 Cf at id. at 482 (recognizing that the law forbidding the use of contraceptives
25

26
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mined that although the right to privacy is not enumerated in
the Bill of Rights, it is implicit in the First Amendment's
guarantee of "freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations."35 Furthermore, protection of privacy could be
found in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments' "protection
against all governmental invasions of the sanctity of a man's
home and the privacies of life."36 The Court found that decisions regarding contraceptives fell within this scope of protection. 37 From these protections, the Court concluded that a
zone of privacy existed within the Constitution. 38 Furthermore, a married person's decision to use contraceptives fell
squarely within that zone of privacy.39
Finding that the decision to use contraceptives was
within the zone of privacy, the Court struck down the Connecticut statute and held that governmental intrusion into the
marital bedroom to search for signs of contraceptive use is
"repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marital
relationship."40 Griswold was the Court's first clear articulation of an individual's fundamental right to privacy.41 However, the right to privacy created therein was not unqualified.
The Griswold Court limited the right of privacy to decisions
and events that occur within the marital relationship.42
A few years later in Eisenstadt v. Baird,43 the Court expanded the Griswold right of privacy to unmarried people. 44
Appellee Baird, a professor, was convicted under a Massachusetts statute45 for giving contraceptive foam to an unmarried
by married people "operates directly on an intimate relation").
35 See id. at 183 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958».
36 See id. at 484 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886».
37 See id. at 485
36 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
39 C{. at id. 485-86 (stating that allowing police to search the marital bedroom for
signs of contraceptive use is repulsive to notions of privacy surrounding marriage).
40 See id. at 486.
41 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
42 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
43 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
44 See id. at 454.
45 See id. at 440 (referring to Massachusetts General Laws Ann., c. 272 which
mandates a maximum five-year term of imprisonment for any person who distributes
contraceptives unless they are a registered medical professional prescribing contraceptives to a married person).
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woman at the conclusion of a lecture on contraception. 46 In Eisenstadt, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, explained
that under Griswold, a state may not prohibit the distribution
of contraceptives to married persons. 47 The Court stated that
to ban the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons
is equally impermissible, because to find otherwise would violate the equal protection right of unmarried individuals. 48
Brennan proclaimed that "[if] the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be
free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
to bear or beget a child."49 Thus, the Court held that the Massachusetts statute was unconstitutional because it provided
dissimilar treatment for married and unmarried persons. 50
Eisenstadt was followed in 1973 by Roe v. Wade. 51 There,
the United States Supreme Court determined whether the
fundamental right to privacy, established in Griswold and expanded by Eisenstadt, extended to a woman's choice to terminate her pregnancy. 52 In Roe, a class action was brought challenging the constitutionality of the Texas criminal law that
prohibited and criminalized abortion except in the event that
it was needed to save the mother's life. 53 Jane Roe, the named
plaintiff, was unmarried, pregnant, and could not afford to
travel to another state to obtain a "legal" abortion. 54 Further,
because her life was not in danger, Roe could not obtain an
abortion in Texas and despite her desire to terminate her
pregnancy, she was forced to carry the child to term. 55
The Court determined that a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy falls within the right of privacy. 56 If a
See id.
See id at 453.
48 See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (citing the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
49 See id. at 453-54.
M See id. at 454-55.
61 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
62 See generally Roe, 410 U.S. at 113.
63 See id. at 117-18 (discussing Texas Penal Code 1191-1194, and 1196).
64 See id. at 120.
66 Cf at 124-25 (explaining that Roe was not pregnant at the time of the district
court hearing).
66 See id. at 153.
46

47
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state denies a woman this choice altogether, a detriment
would be imposed upon her. 57 However, the Court stated that
a woman's right to obtain an abortion is not absolute. 58 In the
context of abortion, the Court held that a state may properly
exercise its important interests in safeguarding health, maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life. 59
However, these state interests must be weighed against a woman's right to privacy in making decisions concerning her
pregnancy.60
In weighing these conflicting interests, the Court recognized that where "fundamental"61 rights, such as the right to
privacy, are involved, a state's intrusion into these rights
must be justified by a "compelling" state interest. 62 The state's
compelling interest in protecting potential life required the
Court to determine whether the fetus, a potential life, is a
"person" deserving of Constitutional protection. 63 The Court
explained that because the Constitution does not specifically
define what a "person" is,64 for the purposes of receiving constitutional protection, a fetus is not considered a "person"
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 65
While the Constitution does not provide protection to the
unborn, the Supreme Court recognized in Roe that the state
does have a legitimate interest in protecting potential life. 66
Furthermore, the Court differentiated Roe from privacy cases
that involve the marital relationship, because a pregnant woman is carrying a potential life in her uterus. 67 For this rea57 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (stating, for example, that being forced by the state to
mother an unwanted child could result in a distressful life, aggravated by the physical and psychological harm associated with overwork and the possible stigma of being
an unwed mother).
58 See id.
59 See id at 154.
60 See id.
61 See id. at 152 (explaining that only personal rights that can be deemed fundamental are included in the idea of personal privacy).
62 See e.g. Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969) quoted
in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 155.
63 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 158.
64 See id. at 157 (explaining that although the word "person" is used in the Fourteenth Amendment, it is used only to apply to those people already born).
65 See id. at 158.
66 See id. at 162.
67 See id. at 159.
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son the Court held that a woman's right to an abortion must
be measured against the fact that a potential life is at stake. 68
Furthermore, the Court agreed that the state also has an interest in preserving and protecting the health of pregnant women. 69 Therefore, in order to reconcile these three distinct interests, the Court determined that the state's interest in
protecting potential life becomes compelling at the point of viability, that is when the fetus is "capable of sustaining life
outside of the womb."70 Therefore, according to Roe, until the
fetus reaches the point of viability, the state may not interfere
with the mother's choice to terminate her pregnancy.71 Moreover, if the mother's health is at stake at any time during the
pregnancy, saving her life overrides any interest the state
may have in protecting the potential life of the fetus. 72
In 1992, the Supreme Court narrowed Roe's holding in
Planned Parenthood u. Casey. 73 The Casey Court recognized
that the state has a compelling interest in potential life at the
point of the fetus' viability.74 However, Justice O'Connor, in
her majority opinion, found that the trimester demarcation,
articulated in Roe, was no longer a sufficient basis for determining viability.75 Technological advancements in the years
separating Roe and Casey rendered the Roe trimester system
outdated. 76 The Casey Court established a new approach to
determining the point at which a state's interest in potential
life becomes compelling. 77 The test for this determination was
whether the regulation in question creates an undue burden
on a woman's right to privacy in making the decision whether
to have an abortion. 78 If the regulation does create such a burden, then the regulation is unconstitutional. 79
68

69
70
71

72
73

74
75

76
77

78

79

See Roe, 410 US. at 154.
See id. at 162.
See id. at 163.
See id. at 164.
See id.
505 US. 833 (1992).
See id. at 870.
See id. at 873.
See id.
See id. at 874.
See Casey, 505 US. at 874.
See id. at 877.
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While Roe and Casey limit a woman's right to privacy in
making decisions concerning her pregnancy, these restrictions
are limited to the context of obtaining an abortion. Although
Casey departed from Roe in establishing how a state determines a fetus' viability for the purposes of the validity of state
intrusion, the rights of the state and the rights of the pregnant woman remained the same. 80 The state retains the right
to prohibit a woman from having an abortion when the potentially aborted fetus is viable. 81 The state may also enact regulations concerning abortion, provided the s~ate's interest is
compelling and the regulations do not unduly burden the woman's right to privacy.82 Nevertheless, women retain the right
to privacy in making decisions concerning their pregnancy, including the decision to have an abortion. 83

B.

FETAL RIGHTS

Although Roe and Casey layout the rights of the woman
and the rights of the state in the context abortion, the Supreme Court has made no clear articulation of whether a fetus has any constitutionally protected rights. In fact, by concluding that a fetus is not a person under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Supreme Court suggests that a fetus has no
rights under the Constitution. 84 Further, the Supreme Court
has not specifically addressed the question of whether the
rights of the state to protect a viable fetus extend into areas
other than abortion. 85 Without guidance on this issue states
have attempted, often without success, to protect the viable
fetus in contexts other than abortion. 86
See id. at 874.
81 See id. at 870.
82 See id. at 874.
83 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
84 See id. at 158.
85 See Cynthia L. Glaze, Comment, Combating Prenatal Substance Abuse: The
State's Current Approach and the Novel Approach of Court-Ordered Protective Custody of the Fetus, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 793, 796 (1997).
88 See id. at 802 (finding by Florida Supreme Court that prosecuting pregnant
women for prenatal substance abuse is the least effective means for combating the
problem of drug use during pregnancy. Michigan courts finding positive drug urinalysis in newborns not sufficient to constitute drug possession for the mothers).
80
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The issue of fetal rights is particularly challenging when
addressing whether the state has a compelling interest in protecting a viable fetus from a mother's conduct during her
pregnancy.87 The state's compelling interest in protecting potential life must be balanced against the mother's fundamental right to make decisions concerning her pregnancy.88 However, women's rights advocates argue that any rights afforded
to a fetus should be limited to the context of abortion. 89 As
the fetus is not afforded any protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the mother has a fundamental right to
make decisions concerning her pregnancy, states should be allowed to intervene in a woman's pregnancy only where abortion is concerned. 90
However, fetal rights advocates read Roe more broadly.91
They believe that Roe stands for the proposition that the fetus
has rights independent of the mother or the state, even before
it becomes viable. 92 Fetal rights advocates further urge that
the existence of these rights were affirmed by the Court's decision in Casey 93 and are only limited by the balancing test. 94
They argue that these independent rights and the conditional
rights already afforded to the fetus in other areas of the law
justify a state's interest in the rights of the fetus in contexts
other than abortion. 95 For example, a fetus is entitled to receive an inheritance provided it is born alive. 96 In tort law,
every state provides a cause of action for prenatal injury, so
long as the viable fetus is later born alive. 97 In addition to
these qualified rights, most states allow a tort cause of action
for prenatal injury to a viable fetus even when the fetus dies
87 See Nova D. Janssen, Note, Fetal Rights and the Prosecution of Women for Using Drugs During Pregnancy, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 741, 742 (2000).
88 See Glaze, supra note 85, at 797.
89 See id. at 796.
90 See id.
91 See id.
92 See id. at 796.
93 But see Casey, 505 U.S. at 876 (stating that the trimester demarcation is incompatible with state interest in potential life throughout pregnancy, as opposed to
articulating that a fetus has rights throughout the pregnancy).
94 See Glaze, supra note 85, at 796-97.
95 See id. at 797.
96 See Janssen, supra note 87, at 750.
97 See id.
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prior to birth. 98 Furthermore, in criminal law, some states allow a cause of action for fetal homicide if the fetus was viable
at the time of the killing. 99
Fetal rights advocates believe that these conditional
rights, and the independent rights that they derive from the
Court's decisions in Roe and Casey, justify a state's intervention into a woman's pregnancy in contexts other than abortion. loo Fetal rights advocates further believe that the state
has an even greater interest in protecting the future life of
the fetus should a mother choose to carry her pregnancy to
term. lOl Since Casey was the last articulation by the Supreme
Court on the issue, whether the position expressed by women's rights advocates or that expressed by fetal rights advocates is the constitutionally supported position is still hotly
contested.
C. STATE INTERVENTION: WOMEN USING ILLEGAL DRUGS DURING
PREGNANCY

Outside of the abortion debate, a major arena in which
states have attempted to create and protect rights for the fetus, is that in which a pregnant woman uses illegal drugs
duIjng her pregnancy.102 The use of illegal drugs by a mother
can have a significant impact on the health of the fetus. lo3 For
example, some of the effects of cocaine and heroin on a fetus
are addiction and withdrawal at birth, low birth weight, short
body length, abnormally small head circumference, birth defects and learning disabilities. lo4 Many states have attempted
to protect the fetus from these potential dangers by charging
a mother who uses illegal drugs while pregnant with child
abuse. lo5
For example, in In Re Ruiz, the Ohio Court of Common
Pleas addressed the question of whether a mother's prenatal
See id.
See Tony Hartsoe, Person or Thing: In Search of the Legal Status of a Fetus: A
Survey of North Carolina Law, 17 CAMPBELL L. REV. 169. 211-12 (1995).
100 See Glaze, supra note 85, at 796-97.
101 See id. at 797.
102 See id. at 793-94.
103 See id. at 793.
104 See id.
105 See Glaze. supra note 85, at 799.
98
99
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conduct constituted child abuse under Ohio's statute. lOG
Luciano Ruiz was born mildly premature, underdeveloped,
and with a host of health problems. lo7 At birth, he tested positive for cocaine and opiates. lOS The source of these traces of
drugs could only be linked to Luciano's mother.109
In order to determine whether Ruiz's mother could be
charged with child abuse for her prenatal use of illegal drugs,
the court first ascertained whether a fetus is a child for the
purposes of finding child abuse. 1lO In determining whether a
fetus is a child under the Ohio statute, the court noted that
the common law typically afforded legal protection beginning
only at birth.1 11 However, prior to Ruiz, Ohio courts had allowed causes of action to be brought for wrongful death of a
viable fetus. ll2 On this basis, the court concluded that an unborn child is entitled to at least some legal protection when
his life has been endangered by another. 113
Additionally, the Ruiz court looked to the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Roe, which provides that a state
has a compelling interest in human life at the time of viability.114 The judge, reluctant to decide whether a fetus should be
awarded a "person's" rights at the time of viability, reasoned
that this question was better left to legal scholars.ll5 However,
for the purpose of determining if a viable fetus is a child
under the child abuse statute, the court found that the protections created in Roe and the civil legal protection afforded to
a fetus by Ohio common law led to the conclusion that the
state has an interest in a child's welfare beginning at viabil106 See In Re Ruiz v. Court of Common Pleas of Wood County, 500 N.E.2d 935,
936 (1986).
107 See id.
108 See id.
109 See id.
llO See id.

See In Re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d at 936.
112 See id. at 937 (quoting Jasinsky v. Potts, 92 N.E.2d 809 (1950) (allowing
causes of action for viable fetus born alive, but dying shortly thereafter), Werling v.
Sandy, 476 N.E.2d 1053 (1985) (allowing cause of action for viable fetus that is later
stillborn».
ll3 See id. at 939.
ll4 See id. at 938.
115 See id. at 937-38.
111
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ity.116 Therefore, the court concluded that Ohio's definition of
child abuse could include prenatal injury caused by drugs consUIiled by a pregnant woman past the point of her fetus'
viability. 117
However, in a later case, Ohio v. Grey, the Ohio Supreme
Court took the opposite approach from the Ruiz decision. 11s
The court stated that words and phrases in Ohio statutes are
to be construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage. 119 Following this rule, one becomes a parent only
when his or her child is born.12o It follows logically that a
child becomes a "child" only when he or she is born. 121 In looking at the same statute that was at issue in Ruiz, the court
found that nowhere had the legislature indicated that it had
intended to include pregnant women in the statutory definition of the word "parent."122 The court further held that
whether pregnant women have a legal duty to protect their
fetuses is a question for the state legislature, not the courts. 123
Therefore, since the legislature had not included the protection of fetuses in the Ohio child abuse statute, the court refused to allow the state of Ohio to convict pregnant women of
child abuse who had used drugs during their pregnancies. 124
State courts seldom address the question of whether a
state's interest in protecting the life of a fetus is compelling
enough to outweigh the mother's constitutionally protected
right to privacy.125 When questions arise concerning state intervention during pregnancy, most states have adopted the
Ohio Supreme Court's approach to look solely at the language
of the child abuse statute to determine if a fetus is included
within its scope of protection. 126 Because state child abuse
statutes often lack language specific to fetuses, most states
will not convict pregnant women under their child abuse
116
117

118
119
120

121
122
123
124

125
126

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

In Re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d at 938.
id. at 939.
Ohio v. Gray, 584 N.E. 2d 710 (1992).
id. at 711 (citing OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1.42).
id.
id.

id. at 712.
Gray, 584 N.E. 2d at 713.
id.

Glaze, supra note 85, at 799.
id. at 801.
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codes for using drugs during pregnancy.127
Because states are unable to press charges against the
mother under the child abuse statutes, some states have
turned to other methods of protecting the fetus when the
state is aware that the mother has been using illegal drugs
throughout the pregnancy.128 For example, the state of Wisconsin has attempted to protect drug-exposed fetuses by placing
the pregnant woman in custody until she gives birth. 129 However, Wisconsin's approach was ultimately unsuccessful.
In Wisconsin v. Kruzicki l30 a pregnant mother tested positive for cocaine and other drugs numerous times during her
pregnancy.131 The County of Waukesha filed a Children in
Need of Health and Protective Services (hereinafter "CHIPS")
petition with the Juvenile Court. 132 The petition alleged that
the fetus was in need of the state's protection because its
"parent neglected, refused or was unable, for reasons other
than poverty, to provide necessary care [ ... ] so as to seriously endanger the physical health of the child."133 A CHIPS
petition is usually filed on behalf of a child who is already
born and, if granted, the child is placed in foster care for its
protection. 134 In order to use a CHIPS petition to protect a fetus, the mother must be placed in custody. The mother in
Kruzicki argued that a fetus is not a child under the Children's Code. 135 The juvenile court ruled against the mother
and placed her in custody for the protection of the "child."136
On appeal, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, finding that a viable fetus is a "child" under Wisconsin's
code.137 Although the state was successful at holding the
mother until term, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the
See id. at 805.
See id. at 806.
129 See id.
130 561 N.W.2d 729 (1997).
131 See id. at 732.
132 See id.
133 See id.
134 See Glaze, supra note 85, at 806.
135 See id. at 808.
136 See id. at 806 (quoting State ex reI Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 197 Wis. 2d 532,
541 (1995)).
137 See id. at 807 (quoting State ex reI Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 197 Wis. 2d 532,
560 (1995)).
127

128
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lower court's decision, finding that the term "child" as it was
used in the relevant child abuse statutes, was too ambiguous
to include a fetus within its meaning. 13S
While some state legislatures have passed laws stating
that drug addiction in a newborn is evidence of child abuse,139
attempts to pass legislation that deters a woman's prenatal illegal drug use while pregnant have mainly failed. 140 In fact,
by allowing a pregnant woman to be prosecuted, the state's
goal of protecting the fetus from the consequences of its
mother's drug use is circumvented because it deters pregnant
mothers from seeking out prenatal care. For example, rather
than face possible prosecution for drug use, many women using illegal drugs while pregnant will simply avoid seeking
medical or prenatal care. 14l Furthermore, incarceration does
not necessarily ensure health for the fetus since prisons often
have inadequate health care. 142
D. A

RIGHT TO PRACTICE ONE'S RELIGION VERSUS THE RIGHT TO
REFUSE MEDICAL CARE

Turning from the considerations of women's privacy
rights in making choices concerning pregnancy, the right to
freely exercise one's religion and to refuse medical care must
also be explored. The First Amendment of the United States
Constitution provides for free exercise of religion. 143 The right
of the individual to refuse medical care as a form of free exercise of religion has been afforded some constitutional protection. The following section will discuss these issues.
1. Right to Religious Freedom

While the right to privacy is not specifically enumerated
in the Bill of Rights, the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution specifically provides for the freedom of religion.144 This right, however, is not without some limita138
139
140
141

142
143
144

See Kruzicki, 561 N.W.2d at 736.
See Glaze, supra note 85, at 803-04.
See id. at 804.
See Johnson v. Florida, 602 So.2d 1288, 1295-96 (1992).
See Glaze, supra note 85, at 804-05.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878).
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tions. 145 Reynolds v. United States 146 is an early Supreme
Court articulation of how far the right to free exercise of religion extends.
In Reynolds, the United States Supreme Court analyzed
whether a Congressional statute forbidding polygamy violated
the First Amendment. 147 The Court distinguished Congress'
authority to legislate religious beliefs from its authority to
legislate religious acts. 148 The Court held that although Congress may not legislate a person's religious beliefs, it may prohibit acts that endanger the public. 149 The plaintiffs in Reynolds were members of the Mormon faith, in which polygamy
was an accepted and encouraged doctrine. 15o The Court found
that the historical prohibition against polygamy is linked to
marriage, a sacred institution in American society that is necessarily intertwined with the concept of monogamy.151 Polygamy, the Court held, is in direct conflict with monogamy and,
therefore, endangers the institution of marriage. 152 Thus, the
Court held that the First Amendment guarantee of religious
freedom did not include the right to practice polygamy. Despite the fact that polygamy was a religious act, it was
banned because it endangered the best interests of the
public. 153
In contrast, over sixty years later, in Cantwell v. Connecticut, :54 the Court struck down a statute that prohibited solicitation without a license when a Jehovah's Witness was convicted under the statute. 155 Although the Court affirmed the
Reynolds holding, finding that religious acts can be regulated,
it held that the restrictions placed upon those acts could not
"unduly infringe" on the individual's freedom of religion. 156
The "unduly infringe" standard provided more protection of
145

146
1(7

14S
149

150
151
152
153

154
155
156

See id. at 166.
98 US. 145 (1878).
See id.
See id. at 166.
See id.
See id. at 145.
See Reynolds, 98 US. at 165-66.
See id.
See id. at 167.
310 US. 296 (1940).
See id. at 311.
See id. at 304.
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religious acts than the Reynolds decision, which articulated no
standard of scrutiny.157 In Cantwell, the licensing official was
authorized to make determinations as to what is a religious
cause when granting or denying licenses. 15s The Court held
that a state may regulate the time, place and manner of solicitation only if it is for the purpose of protecting the best interests of the public. 159 To condition the granting of a license for
solicitation on an official's determination of what constitutes a
religious cause placed a burden on the free exercise of religion. 160 The Court held that this licensing scheme unduly infringed on Cantwell's free exercise of religion and was therefore unconstitutional. 161
A few years later in Prince u. Massachusetts,162 the Court
upheld a Massachusetts child labor law which prohibited children from selling printed material on the street. 163 Prince, a
Jehovah's Witness, permitted her nine-year old niece, also a
Jehovah's Witness, to sell "The Watch Tower" on the street. l64
Prince argued that the statute violated the child's "God-given
right and constitutional right to preach the gospel."165 The
Court held that although a parent has a right to give his children religious training and a child has a right to exercise his
religion, these rights are not absolute when they threaten an
important public interest. 166 The Court held that the important public interest in protecting children from the evils of
child labor was more important than either a parent's right or
a child's right to free exercise of religion. 167 Forbidding chilSee Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166.
See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 302.
159 See id. at 306-07.
160 See id. at 307.
161 See id. at 306.
162 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
163 See id. at 170.
164 See id. at 162 (discussing the distribution of the "Watch Tower," an informational pamphlet published by the' Jehovah's Witnesses).
165 See id.
166 See id. at 166. Compare with Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(upholding a parent's authority to provide religious schooling, and a child's right to
receive it, against the state's requirement that children attend public schools).
167 See Prince, 321 U.S. at 166-67 (articulating some of the areas in which a state
could properly legislate, in the interest of protecting children, that would supersede
both the rights of religion and the rights of parenthood. Interestingly, the Court
stated that a parent cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for either
157

158
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dren to sell "The Watch Tower" on the street did not unduly
infringe on the rights of Prince or her niece to freely practice
their religion. 168
2. Refusal of Medical Care

Although not specifically enumerated in the Bill of
Rights, a competent person may generally refuse to undergo
medical treatment, even if such treatment may prove to be
life-saving. 169 Courts at all levels have upheld this right without elaborating on the reasoning behind it yo Courts have also
consistently upheld a competent adult's refusal of medical
care on the grounds that refusal to consent to medical care is
encompassed in the individual's fundamental right to privacy.l7l In fact, courts consistently impose civil liability on
those who perform medical treatment without the consent of a
competent adult.172 As with other rights included under the
purview of a right to privacy, such as the right to an abortion,
a state must assert an important governmental interest when
inflicting medical care on the person in question, for that individual's right to refuse medical care to be legally
overridden. 173
Courts have also upheld a patient's right to refuse medical care on the grounds that medical care violates his or her
himself or his child on religious grounds).
168 See id. at 170.
169 See 93 A.L.R.3d 67 (3a)(2000). See also Palm Springs General Hospital v. Martinez, Dade Co CC, Fla (1971) (upholding elderly patient's refusal to undergo blood
transfusions and surgery, despite inevitable death, because Florida's interest in compelling treatment was minimal).
170 See id.
171 See id. at (3c). See also Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (1978) (holding that
an elderly man had a right to have mechanical respiration discontinued based upon
the constitutional right to privacy). See also Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978)
(holding that a woman's constitutional right to privacy entitled her to refuse to consent to having her gangrenous leg amputated).
172 See id. at (3b).
173 See id. See also Wons v. Public Health Trust, 500 So. 2d 679 (1987) (holding
that trial court erred in authorizing hospital to administer involuntary blood transfusions to a Jehovah's Witness where the State had no compelling interest sufficient to
override the patient's constitutional right to practice her religion according to her
conscience). For example, a state may assert an interest in preventing an adult from
refusing medical care when the adult has dependent, minor children and receipt of
medical care would prevent the children from becoming orphans.
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religious beliefs.174 However, as with the right to privacy, a
compelling governmental interest may allow the state to limit
the right to free exercise of religion because the right to refuse medical care is fundamental, but not absolute.175 States
have successfully asserted a compelling governmental interest
in saving the life of a viable fetus, thereby requiring medical
procedures even though the pregnant woman refuses the procedures on religious grounds. 176 Courts have also permitted
states to assert this interest when forcing pregnant women
into medical confinement when these women have previously
refused medical treatment that would prevent the death of
their fetuses. 177
In Jefferson u. Griffin Spalding Hospital Authority,178 the
Georgia Supreme Court forced a pregnant woman to undergo
a surgical procedure that could save the life of her child over
her religion based objection to surgery.179 Without the surgery,
doctors predicted that the child had a one percent chance of
surviving the birth, the mother a fifty percent chance. 18o With
the surgery, both the mother and child had nearly a onehundred percent chance of survival. 181 Despite the fact that
the mother refused surgery on religious grounds, the court
held that the state had an interest in the potential life of the
viable fetus. The state further argued that its intrusion into
the woman's right to privacy was outweighed by its duty to
give the fetus an opportunity to live. 182 As a result, the state
forced the mother to undergo the surgery. 183
See 93 A.L.R.3d 67 (3d). See also id. at (3b). See also Wons v. Public Health
Trust, 500 So. 2d 679 (1987) (holding that trial court erred in authorizing hospital to
administer involuntary blood transfusions to a Jehovah's Witness over her religious
objections).
175 See id. at (3d). See also Wons v. Public Health Trust, 500 So. 2d 679 (1987)
(holding that trial court erred in authorizing hospital to administer involuntary blood
transfusions to a Jehovah's Witness where state had no compelling interest sufficient
to override patient's constitutional right to practice her religion according to her
conscience).
176 See Glaze, supra note 85, at 812.
177 See id. at 812-13.
178 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981).
179 See id.
180 See id. at 458.
181 See id.
182 See id. at 460.
183 See Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 460.
174
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In his concurring opinion, one Justice stated that although the First Amendment grants absolute freedom of religious belief, it does not grant absolute freedom of religious
acts. 1S4 However, when restricting a religious act, the state
must take the least burdensome path possible.ls5 Even in taking the least burdensome path, a state still must demonstrate
a compelling interest.1SG Protecting the life of a viable fetus
and its mother are both compelling state interests. 1S7 In this
case, there was no less burdensome path than forcing the
mother to undergo surgery.1SS Under these extreme circumstances, forcing the mother to undergo surgery against her religious beliefs was not a violation of the First Amendment. 1S9
The Jefferson court held that the state of Georgia demonstrated a compelling interest in requiring the mother to undergo surgery because both her life and that of her fetus were
in serious danger. 19o However, when faced with a situation
similar to that in Jefferson, other courts have ruled differently.l9l For example, the Illinois Appellate Court. overruled
the trial court's ruling that a pregnant woman be required to
undergo blood transfusions for the benefit of her viable fetus,
a procedure she refused to undergo on religious grounds. 192
The court held that the refusal of medical care in such an instance outweighed the state's interest in the welfare of the viable fetus, even though both the fetus and the mother were
likely to die without the blood transfusions. 193
Protecting a viable fetus from imminent death, even
outside of the abortion context, has been held to be a compelling state interest. 194 However, the contention that this interSee id. at 461 (Smith, J., concurring).
See id. (Smith, J., concurring).
188 See id. (Smith, J., concurring).
187 See id. (Smith, J., concurring).
188 See Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 461 (Smith, J., concurring).
189 See id. (Smith, J., concurring).
190 See id. at 460.
191 See ego In Re Brown, 294 Ill. App. 3d 159, 172 (1997) (holding that a woman's
right to refuse blood transfusions that would benefit her fetus outweighs State's interest in the welfare of the viable fetus).
192 See id. at 171.
193 See generally id. at 172.
194 See generally Anderson, 42 NJ at 423 (stating that an unborn child is entitled
to the law's protection and the mother should receive blood transfusions because
184

185
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est is compelling has not been echoed by, nor has it been articulated by the United States Supreme Court. By contrast,
when only the "welfare" of the fetus is at stake, such as when
a mother is using drugs while pregnant, or where a fetus
would be benefit from a medical procedure that is not necessarily life preserving, the state is less likely to have a compelling enough interest to override fundamental individual
rights. 195
III.

DISCUSSION

A Massachusetts judge ordered Rebecca Corneau to undergo a prenatal exam because she was suspected of covering
up the circumstances surrounding the death of her last baby,
Jeremiah. 196 Because of Jeremiah's death, the state feared for
the safety of Comeau's fetus. 197 Comeau refused to submit to
a court-ordered physical exam giving as her reason that to receive medical care is to "bow down to a false god."198 Upon her
refusal, Corneau was taken into custody for failure to obey
the court order.199 Corneau was then confined in the Neil J.
Houston House, a medical facility in Roxbury, Massachusetts,
and forced to remain there for the duration of her pregnancy.200 This decision may have been the first time a healthy
woman had been forced into the state's custody to protect the
health and welfare of an unbom child. 201
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that a person shall
not be deprived of his liberty without due process of law. 202
There are two major ways in which a state may deprive a person of his or her liberty, without a criminal conviction, and
remain consistent with this constitutional mandate: preventive detention and civil commitment. Massachusetts' forced
confinement of Comeau presents several constitutional questheir lives are intertwined).
195 See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
196 See supra notes 3-13 and accompanying text.
197 See Jacob H. Fries, Court Action Planned Against a Cult Member, THE
GLOBE, Aug. 31, 2000, at B2.
198 See Abel, supra note 6.
199 See id.
200 See id.
201 See id.
202 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
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tions, each concern the right to liberty provided for in the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. First, Massachusetts exercised preventive detention over Corneau although
she is not a criminal defendant. 203 Second, Massachusetts
placed Corne au in civil commitment although she is not incompetent,204 nor has she been proven to be a risk either to
herself or another person. 205 This section will discuss these
issues.
A. THE PREVENTIVE DETENTION DOCTRINE

AND ITS APPLICABIL-

ITY TO REBECCA CORNEAU

A state may confine a criminal defendant, prior to trial
and without bail, if it fears that the defendant is dangerous to
the public at large, or to a certain segment of the public. 206
This practice is called the preventive detention doctrine. 207
The preventive detention doctrine raises the issue of whether
pretrial freedom can be denied to a criminal defendant because of his suspected criminal tendencies. 208 The main objection to this doctrine is that the deprivation of a defendant's
freedom prior to finding him or her guilty is a denial of the
defendant's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.209 However, the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 allows
preventive detention when there is evidence of past
criminality. 210
In United States v. Salerno 211 the United States Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Federal Bail Reform
Act of 1984. 212 The Court stated that to exercise preventive
detention, the state must have a legitimate and compelling
regulatory interest in protecting the public that outweighs an
:zoo See infra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.

See infra notes 233-34 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 235-36 and accompanying text.
206 See 75 A.L.R. 3d 956 (2a) (1977).
207 See id.
208 See id. at (1).
209 See Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure' of InterestBalancing Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510, 557 (1986).
210 See, JOSHUA DRESSER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 549-52 (2d ed.
1996).
211 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
212 See id. at 754.
204

205
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individual's liberty interest. 213 In order to show that the interest is compelling, the government must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the arrestee "presents an identified
and articulable threat to an individual or the community."214 If
this threat is demonstrated, then detention is consistent with
the Due Process Clause. 215
However, application of the preventive detention doctrine
requires that the person confined is a criminal defendant. 216
Although eight members of Comeau's religious group, including Comeau's husband, have been placed in custody for refusing to answer questions about the two infants' deaths,
Comeau was not one of them.217 Comeau was, in fact, never
arrested, nor was she charged with any crime prior to her
forced medical confinement. 218 Therefore, whether Massachusetts has the authority to hold Comeau in preventive detention is an issue that requires resolution.
B.

CIVIL COMMITMENT

Preventive detention is a criminal procedure, and as such
can only be applied apropos criminal defendants. 219 However,
outside of the criminal context, the state may institute civil
confinement for persons who present a danger to themselves
or others.220 This procedure is called civil commitment and results in confinement in a state mental hospital for varying
lengths of time. 221 Although the Massachusetts legislature
provides for the civil commitment of mentally incompetent
people, absent a finding of incompetence, the law requires
that the person confined manifest a likelihood of serious harm
to either himself or another person. 222 In order to demonstrate
that a person is a danger to himself, the state must establish
evidence of threats or attempts of suicide or other significant
213
214
215
216
217
218
219

220
221
222

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 749-750.
id. at 75l.
id.
75 A.L.R. 3d 956 §2(a).
Abel, supra note 6.
TALKBACK, supra note 13.
75 A.L.R. 3d 956 (1977) §2(a).
infra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 419-20 (1979).
Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 123, §12a (2000).
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bodily harm. 223 Likewise, in order to show that the person is a
danger to others, the state must establish evidence of homicidal or other violent behavior, or evidence that others are in
reasonable fear of such behavior.224 .
Similar to the preventive detention doctrine, civil commitment raises the issue of whether the involuntary confinement
of a person by the state violates his due process rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment. 225 A person forced into confinement under civil commitment is necessarily deprived of his
liberty. In most civil actions, where a person's liberty is not at
stake, there must be a showing that what is being contended
is more likely than not to have occurred. 226 This standard of
proof is known as the "preponderance of the evidence."227 However, in circumstances of civil commitment, the Constitution
requires that the burden of proof be more rigorous because
one's liberty is at stake. 228
In Addington v. Texas 229 the United States Supreme Court
addressed this problem. Although a state has a legitimate interest in protecting the public from physical harm, the Court
found that the standard civil action burden of proof, preponderance of the evidence, is insufficient when it may result in
the deprivation of a person's liberty.230 The Court held that
when a state deprives a person of liberty through civil commitment, the state must prove the necessity to do so by at
least clear and convincing evidence. 231 As a result, this higher
standard of proof places a more stringent burden upon states
to show that a person presents a danger to himself or others,
and should be confined.
As a preliminary matter, Massachusetts' civil commitment statutes mandate that a person be incompetent before
See id. at § l.
224 See id. at §l.
225 See Addington, 441 U.S. 418, 420 (1979).
226 See generally id. at 423 (reasoning that as society has minimal concerns in
the outcome of private monetary suits the preponderance of the evidence standard is
all that is required).
227 See id.
228 See id. at 427.
229 See id. at 418 .
. 230 See Addington, 441 U.S. at 427.
231 See id. at 433.
223
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he or she can be placed in state custody.232 For one to be declared incompetent, he or she must lack sufficient physical,
mental or legal qualifications. 233 The state has not declared
Comeau to be incompetent, yet it has placed her in a state
hospital. 234 Without a showing of incompetence, application of
civil commitment requires a showing by clear and convincing
evidence that the person is likely to harm himself or others.235
As a result, Comeau should not be confined under this statute. Furthermore, since a fetus is not a person under the
Fourteenth Amendment,236 and the Massachusetts civil commitment law does not include a fetus in its definition of person,237 whether Massachusetts has the authority to place
Comeau in confinement under its civil commitment laws requires an answer.
IV.

CRITIQUE

Rebecca Comeau was confined by the state of Massachusetts against her will because she was pregnant and refused
to submit to medical care. 238 Corneau states that she refused
this care because it was prohibited by her religion. 239 Massachusetts placed Comeau in custody due to some unsubstantiated future harm it feared she would impose on her fetus, yet
failed to charge her with a crime, deem her incompetent, or
demonstrate that her fetus was in ill health. This state's action and its reasoning is extremely questionable, in light of
the fact that the Supreme Court has held that a fetus is nota
person under the Fourteenth Amendment,240 and that most
states refuse to protect fetuses even from the grave effects of
prenatal drug exposure. 241
Most states remain reluctant to articulate fundamental
rights for fetuses, even at the expense of protecting the fetus
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240

241

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 123, §4.
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY (6th ed.1991).
Abel, supra note 6.
Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 123, §l. See also Addington, 441 US. at 427.
Roe, 410 US. at 158.
Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 123, §1
Cannon, supra note 8.
id.
Roe, 410 US. at 158.
Glaze, supra note 85, at 799.
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from the detrimental health effects of exposure of prenatal
drug exposure. 242 States' reluctance to do so is consistent with
the Supreme Court's holding in Roe that a fetus is not a person under the Fourteenth Amendment. 243 This conclusion is
crucial to the Corneau situation because Massachusetts
placed the supposed rights of a fetus, which is not a person
deserving of constitutional protections,244 above the rights of
Corneau, a person who is entitled to constitutional· protections. 245 As a result, Comeau's rights to due process, privacy,
and free exercise of religion were blatantly violated for no
compelling reason.246
A. CORNEAU'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WAS VIOLATED

Holding Corneau in confinement for an entire month
without charging her with a crime, violated her due process
rights. Preventive detention is permissible only for criminal
defendants. 247 Furthermore, civil commitment is appropriate
only when a person is declared incompetent or the state
shows by clear and convincing evidence that if the person is
not put in confinement, a great likelihood exists that he will
endanger himself or others. The state of Massachusetts lacked
a basis to confine Corneau under either of these procedures
therefore her medical confinement was unconstitutional.248

1. Preventive Detention Does Not Apply to Corneau
Implicit in the preventive detention doctrine is that the
person confined is a criminal defendant. 249 Comeau was never
arrested or charged with any crime on which to base a preventive detention. 250 Furthermore, in order for a state to hold
a person in custody without bail and without making a finding of guilt, it must prove by clear and convincing evidence
242
243
244

245
246
247
248
249

250

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 158.
supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
infra notes 255-58 and accompanying text.
supra notes 238-41 and accompanying text.
75 A.L.R. 3d 956 §2(a).
infra notes 249-51 and 253-54 and accompanying text.
75 A.L.R. 3d 956 §2(a).
TALKBACK, supra note 13.
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that the person presents an "identifiable and articulable
threat to an individual or the community."251 The state of
Massachusetts has not indicated that Comeau presents such
a threat. It has not arrested or charged her with any crime.
As a result, Corneau is not a criminal defendant and should
not have been placed under preventive detention.
Had Corneau been arrested on contempt charges, the
state may have had legal support for holding Comeau in custody. Her pregnancy and birth could have been easily monitored because she would be in jail,252 However, by simply placing Corneau in "medical confinement," without charging her
with a crime and without showing by clear and convincing evidence that she posed a threat to the public, Corneau's due
process right to liberty, protected by the Fourteenth Amendement, was violated.

2. Civil Commitment Does Not Apply to Corneau
The state of Massachusetts further violated Corneau's
right to due process because she did not fit the criteria to be
civilly committed. A civil commitment requires that the state
show by clear and convincing evidence that the person is incompetent or a serious threat to herself or others.253 The state
never declared Corneau to be incompetent. Further, because
Corneau's fetus is not a person deserving of protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Massachusetts civil commitment statute did not include fetus in those subject to the
likelihood of harm, her refusal to submit to prenatal care does
not pose a serious harm to another person. 254 Therefore, by
placing Corneau in civil confinement, the state of Massachusetts deprived her of her right to liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

251

See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751.

252

See TALKBACK, supra note 13.

253

See supra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.

254

See Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 123, §1. See also supra notes 64-65 and accompany-

ing text.
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B. CORNEAU'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN MAKING DECISIONS CONCERNING HER PREGNANCY WAS VIOLATED

Massachusetts wrongfully forced Corneau into confinement for refusing to undergo a prenatal exam. 255 Individuals
have a fundamental right to make decisions concerning their
pregnancy in private. 256 In order for a state to infringe upon
this fundamental right to privacy, it must show a compelling
governmental reason for doing SO.257 Because the state had no
evidence that Comeau or her fetus were anything but healthy
when she was forced into medical custody, Massachusetts
lacked a compelling reason to force her to have a prenatal
exam. 258 As a result, Massachusetts violated Comeau's right
to privacy.
The Supreme Court's decisions in Roe and Casey support
the proposition that a state's compelling interest in protecting
potential life applies only when a woman plans to terminate
her pregnancy when her fetus is viable. 259 In Casey, the Supreme Court narrowed Roe by changing the trimester method
of determining when a fetus is viable, thereby expanding a
state's compelling interest in protecting potentiallife. 260 Under
.Casey, the test became whether a regulation unduly infringes
on a woman's right to make decisions concerning her pregnancy.261 This new test did not, however, change the interests
at stake. The interests remained that a woman has a fundamental right to privacy in deciding whether to have an abortion, limited only by a state's compelling interest in protecting
the potential life of a viable fetus. 262
Furthermore, in addressing whether particular legislation
would unduly infringe on a woman's fundamental right to privacy, the Court only addressed regulations specifically related
to abortion. 263 The fact that the Court did not articulate the
See TALKBACK, supra note 13.
See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
~7 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
~8 See TALKBACK, supra note 13.
~9 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.
260 See id. at 870.
261 See id. at 874.
262 See id. at 879.
263 See id. at 879-901 (examining whether requiring a 24 hour waiting period
before receiving an abortion, parental notification for pregnant minors seeking abor255
256
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possibility that a state could have a compelling interest in
protecting potential life outside of the abortion context, suggests that the Court did not intend for a state to assert that
interest.
However, even if the reasoning in Casey is extended to
contexts other than abortion, the state of Massachusetts still
lacked a compelling interest to violate Comeau's right to privacy. In asserting an interest in potential life, a state must
not unduly infringe on a woman's right to privacy in making
these decisions. 264 By placing Corneau in confinement, the
state rendered it impossible for her to make and carry out decisions concerning her pregnancy.
If allowed to assert fetal rights, a state could easily find
that a woman who drank a beer, smoked a cigarette, or didn't
wear a seat belt while pregnant should be locked up under
the justification that her behavior put the fetus' life at risk. 265
Accordingly, if women were forced to submit to prenatal exams, a huge burden would be placed on those women who
cannot afford prenatal care, do not have access to it, or do not
believe in it. 266

Furthermore, allowing states to confine pregnant women
suspected of past crimes could extend to allowing states to
confine pregnant women who have actually committed past
crimes. The problem then arises as to what types of convictions would require the confinement of pregnant women. This
type of control over a pregnant woman's life would grant the
state unfettered permission to infringe on her privacy. To allow such intrusion is impermissible and arbitrary, and yet it
is the precedent that is being set by allowing Massachusetts
to confine Rebecca Comeau for her refusal to consent to prenatal care.
tions, and spousal consent for woman seeking abortions unduly burdened a woman's
right to choose}.
264

See Casey, 505 U.S. at 874.

266

See TALKBACK, supra note 13.

266

See id.
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C. CORNEAU'S RIGHT TO FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION WAS
VIOLATED

The right to freely exercise one's religion is fundamental.2 67 However, if a state has a compelling governmental interest in protecting the public, it may infringe or limit an individual's free exercise right. 268 Corneau asserts that refusing
to submit to a prenatal exam is within her rights because to
submit to medical care violates her religious beliefs.269 Although a competent adult may generally refuse to submit to
medical care without recriminations, the state imposed a different standard for pregnant women. 270 States have required
pregnant women to undergo medical procedures. However,
Massachusetts' action to confine Corneau when the fetus was
in no danger of ill health is unprecedented.
The American Medical Association Board of Trustees
stated that judicial intervention, to order medical care for
pregnant women is appropriate only if an exceptional circumstance is found in which "treatment (1) poses an insignificantor - no health risk to the woman, (2) entails minimal invasion
of her bodily integrity, and (3) would clearly prevent substantial and irreversible harm to her fetus . . . "271 Forcing
Corneau to submit to prenatal care posed no significant
health risk to her. However, whether it prevented substantial
and irreversible harm to her fetus is unclear. Therefore the
standard was not met. Furthermore, forcing Corneau into confinement until she comes to term substantially invades her
bodily integrity. Such confinement constitutes a maximum invasion because it hinders both her movement and her decision-making abilities. It hinders her freedom. Furthermore,
because there has been no showing that Corneau's fetus is in
grave danger of death by her not receiving medical care, to
force her to do so anyway infringes on her right to live according to her religious convictions. 272 Absent a compelling governmental reason, a state may not unduly infringe on a person's
267
268
269
270
271

272

See
See
See
See
See
See

Prince, 321 U.S. at 165.
id. at 166.
Cannon, supra note 8.
93 A.L.R.3d 67 §3a.
Glaze, supra note 85, at 814.
Wons, 500 So. 2d 679.
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right to religious freedom. This interest has not been demonstrated by Massachusetts, and Corneau's rights have been
violated.
V. PROPOSAL

Despite the fact that Massachusetts acted in violation of
Comeau's constitutional rights in forcing her into custody, a
state should be permitted to protect the health and welfare of
the unborn. The dilemma is how to protect a future life without granting rights to a fetus to which it is not entitled, while
respecting all of the rights of the mother. The state has an interest in Corneau's situation, because it is aware of two infants' deaths, one of whom was Comeau's son. Furthermore,
Comeau's religious group refused to cooperate in the state's
investigation into the infants' deaths, and Corneau was unlikely to have her next child in a hospital, or seek out any further medical care for that child. However, to allow the state
to confine an individual on unsubstantiated suspicions results
in a whittling away of the very concepts which the Constitution was written to protect: freedoms such as liberty, privacy,
and the free exercise of religion.
A state in Massachusetts' position must simply comply
with the Constitution. The state must show a compelling interest in order to infringe on a woman's right to privacy in
making decisions concerning her pregnancy, and her right to
freely exercise her religion by refusing medical care. If the interest is not compelling, state action infringes on these rights.
Although to refrain from taking action in such a circumstance
may result in harm to a fetus, violating the fundamental constitutional rights is disastrous in the long run. If the state
may confine a pregnant woman merely suspected of potentially harming her fetus, the state has unbridled power to
control almost every aspect of a woman's life during her pregnancy. The Constitution is meant to prevent such unbridled
governmental power and should be followed.
VI. CONCLUSION

Rebecca Comeau should not have been placed in the custody of the state of Massachusetts. The state failed to demonstrate the requisite clear and convincing evidence needed to
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confine her either under the preventive detention doctrine or
under its civil commitment statute. Furthermore, because a
fetus is not a person under the Fourteenth Amendment, the
state may not remain consistent with the Constitution and infringe on Corneau's right to make decisions concerning her
pregnancy, including the decision not to have prenatal care.
Because Corneau and her fetus were not in ill health, the
state did not have a compelling reason to force her to submit
to medical care. Furthermore, forcing Corneau into confinement for refusing medical care on religious grounds is not the
least burdensome method of protecting life and unduly infringed on her right to free exercise of religion. The forced
confinement of Rebecca Corneau was a flagrant violation of
many of her constitutionally protected rights and should not
be permitted to happen again in Massachusetts or any other
state in the United States.
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